Sayari Graph is an easy to use investigative tool to root out forced labor risk in your supply chain. Follow along with this tutorial in Sayari Graph for a real world example of how to uncover nonobvious potential exposure to forced labor through a supplier.
Let’s say one of your suppliers is a Chinese polysilicon producer named Jinzhou Xinyu Material. We’ll be using this case for the purposes of demonstration, but the same workflow could be applied to any sector. Follow along in Graph to get a sense of the platform and how to conduct a sample forced labor investigation.
Sayari’s entity profiles are built from records from which we have extracted attributes and relationships, and subsequently added risk insights. You will find a top search result with the China Unified Social Credit Code: 91210700701620122U. In this case, we’re searching for a fairly unique name and return limited results. But for searches with more results, it can be helpful to break down the results using post-query filters or advanced search.
Since entity profiles are constructed with data pulled directly from native language records, we are getting results in Chinese. Most customers won’t speak all the languages that might come up in their investigations, so up in the very top right hand corner of the platform we have a Translate button that can translate to and from any language using the Google Translate API. Translated content is highlighted in yellow.
The entity profile has a summary section of key identifiers and sources at the top and a navigation pane on the left. The three key elements of every entity profile in Graph are Attributes, Relationships, and Source Records.
The number on the top right hand corner of any node on a graph indicates how many entities that node is directly connected to. Single clicking on an entity will bring up an information pane on the right. You can also view the summary of an entity’s key identifiers here as well or follow these links to the entity profiles. Click the Expand Names button to view full entity names.
Note that the icon for Jinzhou Jingyu Optoelectronics Silicon Materials Co., Ltd. is grayed out which indicates that the company is closed. The shareholding relationship to Jinzhou Xinyu Materials is also marked as a former relationship. You will also see orange caution signs on three profiles, including Jinzhou Xinyu Materials as well as the company’s direct shareholder and a subsidiary, Jinzhou New Century Energy Technology Group. If you click on any of those profiles and hover over the Forced Labor risk indicator below the name, you’ll get a preview of the underlying risk - all three entities are direct or indirect owners of a Xinjiang-based entity.
Now that we know the risk is originating from an indirect subsidiary of Jinzhou Xinyu Material, we can continue building out the network in a more targeted fashion by digging deeper into the subsidiaries of Jinzhou New Century Energy Technology Group. We can see that a 57% subsidiary, Xinjiang Grand New Energy Co., Ltd. carries several risk factors and is the likely origin of the risk for Jinzhou Xinyu Materials. Locations (including cities and provinces) at the beginning of Chinese company names correspond to where the entity was registered and indeed “Xinjiang-registered entity” is one of the risk factors present on further inspection in the information pane.
Use the information panes to preview the business purposes for Jinzhou Xinyu Material and Xinjiang Grand New Energy. You’ll find that Jinzhou Xinyu Material reports that it engages in the production and sales of high-purity silicon materials while Xinjiang Grand New Energy, among others, reports that it produces polysilicon raw materials and finished goods. In this case, the fact that the Xinjiang-registered subsidiary operates in the same sector increases the risk that inputs from Xinjiang Grand New Energy may be incorporated into goods sold or exported by Jinzhou Xinyu Material.